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Abstract
The Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) creates distortions of body ownership through multimodal integration of somatosensory
and visual inputs. This illusion largely rests on bottom-up (automatic multisensory and perceptual integration) mechanisms.
However, the relative contribution from top-down factors, such as controlled processes involving attentional regulation,
remains unclear. Following previous work that highlights the putative influence of higher-order cognition in the RHI, we
aimed to further examine how modulations of working memory load and task instructions—two conditions engaging topdown cognitive processes—influence the experience of the RHI, as indexed by a number of psychometric dimensions.
Relying on exploratory factor analysis for assessing this phenomenology within the RHI, our results confirm the influence
of higher-order, top-down mental processes. Whereas task instruction strongly modulated embodiment of the rubber
hand, cognitive load altered the affective dimension of the RHI. Our findings corroborate that top-down processes shape
the phenomenology of the RHI and herald new ways to improve experimental control over the RHI.
Keywords
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Feelings of owning your body and limbs—body ownership—represent a core component of our conscious experiences. This central feature follows from the significant
amount of interoceptive and exteroceptive sensations processed by the brain, while our bodies provide the main perspective from which we engage our environment and the
emergence of selfhood and personal identity (de
Vignemont, 2011). Importantly, the phenomenological
experience of owning your body follows from complex
neural processes that include multisensory integration (de
Vignemont, 2011; Longo et al., 2008; Tsakiris, 2010).
Grounded in this overarching framework, the current
research investigates whether higher-order cognition
exerts a top-down influence over the Rubber Hand Illusion
(RHI)—a phenomenological distortion of body ownership
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). In the standard approach to
the RHI, participants’ real hands are occluded from their
view and replaced with a clearly visible fake rubber arm
positioned so as to mimic their actual limb. Stroking the
visible fake hand and the occluded real hand simultaneously in this context yields peculiar feelings of ownership
over the fake arm. The synchronicity of visual and tactile
sensations therefore leads to inferences that skew feelings

of body ownership to the point of incorporating the fake
rubber hand (Riemer et al., 2019).1
In recent years, a growing body of research has focused
on the mechanisms underlying the emergence of these
body distortions to inform the phenomenology of selfhood
and embodiment (Kilteni et al., 2015; Tsakiris, 2010,
2017). This work shows that body ownership represents an
intrinsic component of our conscious experiences, as the
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2
coupling between sensorimotor processes and the environment shapes how we interface with the world (de
Vignemont, 2011; Hurley, 1998). Thus, our body seemingly represents an extension of the conscious mind, while
the RHI emphasises the malleability of these representations. Prevailing views often argue that the unusual experience of the RHI proceeds from inferential processes that
integrate somatosensory, proprioceptive, and visual inputs
(Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Botvinick & Cohen,
1998; Samad et al., 2015; Seth, 2013). The attribution of
tactile sensations to the fake arm seemingly proceeds from
temporal alignment with visual inputs, which entails that
the influence of sight on the RHI is contingent on temporal
coupling between sensations (Shimada et al., 2009, 2014).
Beyond these core components, ongoing research further highlights the influence of top-down factors, thus
departing from a wholly bottom-up account (DempseyJones & Kritikos, 2014; Kilteni et al., 2015). For example,
inconsistencies between the position of the rubber hand
and internal representations of the real limb’s actual posture impair the RHI, thus showing that prior information
shapes the emergence of this phenomenon (Ehrsson et al.,
2004). Likewise, handedness, anatomy, texture, incorporeability, affect, and awareness of internal body signals can
also modulate the illusion to some extent (Dempsey-Jones
& Kritikos, 2017, 2019; Kilteni et al., 2015; Tsakiris, 2010,
2017). The idea that top-down factors can influence the
RHI is reminiscent of findings that similarly feature the
involvement of top-down suggestions in the context of
other multimodal sensory integration phenomena, such as
the McGurk effect (e.g., Déry et al., 2014; Lifshitz et al.,
2013; McGurk & MacDonald, 1976), and therefore echoes
recent discussions about multisensory integration more
generally (Hartcher-O’Brien et al., 2017).
The current work aims to expand this research trajectory by investigating the impact of top-down factors over
the RHI. Our experimental approach follows from previous work on the decomposition of embodiment into different latent constructs via an established questionnaire and
factor analysis, including feelings of embodiment (Longo
et al., 2008). Embodiment refers to the idea that the body
shapes our psychological processes, whereby the features
of the human mind are predicated upon the features of the
human body. We therefore intended to use a similar model
for the assessment of top-down factors onto the different
dimensions of body ownership in the RHI. Our strategy
was twofold. First, we altered the availability of cognitive
resources using a working memory load manipulation—a
standard experimental approach to examine the involvement of higher-order cognitive resources in psychological
phenomena (e.g., Bodner & Stalinski, 2008; Fahey et al.,
2018). This experimental manipulation assesses the capacities of higher-order cognition, such as voluntary attention
or working memory, by diverting cognitive resources away
from the primary task and towards a secondary somewhat
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difficult one (Gazzaley & Nobre, 2012). Resource limitations therefore arise when performance suffers from having to engage both tasks simultaneously.
Working memory contributes to filtering certain sensory stimuli at an early processing stage of processing, as
revealed by corresponding changes in precortical sensory
responses (Sörqvist et al., 2012). Some researchers propose that engaging working memory resources via a secondary task likely affects the ability of attention to act as a
gatekeeper for early sensory inputs (Sörqvist et al., 2012).
Accordingly, evidence shows that cognitive load interferes
with attention processes (de Fockert et al., 2001; Lavie,
2010; Lavie et al., 2004), multisensory integration and
postural control (Andersson et al., 1998; Redfern et al.,
2001), and proprioceptive ability matching performance
(Goble et al., 2012), possibly by interfering with early and
late perceptual and attentional processes (Lavie, 2010).
Note that these processes are likely involved in the RHI.
Following the idea that working memory also contributes to binding information together to form of a unified
percept (Quak et al., 2015), we reasoned that engaging
working memory resources away from the RHI would
impair inferential processes involved in generating the
illusion. Consistent with our hypothesis, evidence shows
that attentional load weakens the McGurk effect (Alsius
et al., 2005, 2007, 2014; Buchan & Munhall, 2011a, 2012).
However, in contrast to this prediction, a recent study
showed that modulating working memory capacities via a
load manipulation hardly reduces the strength of the RHI,
thereby providing support to the notion that this illusion is
relatively automatic and requires minimal cognitive effort
(Fahey et al., 2018). Our research therefore provides the
means to replicate and validate this null outcome.
Our second manipulation aimed to assess whether
instructions intended to shift one’s focus to emphasise
somatosensory inputs or the visual ones would modulate
the strength of the illusion. This strategy follows from the
idea that multisensory integration likely involves a weighting procedure that fuse sensory signals together, while
attention critically change these weights (Kayser & Shams,
2015; Talsma et al., 2010). Based on this construal, we
hypothesised that overweighting tactile or visual inputs by
attending to one versus the other would alter the emergence of the RHI. In other words, emphasising signals pertaining to the real arm, as opposed to a fake one, would
better ground the experience of body ownership into somatosensations, thus reducing the influence of seeing the fake
arm being stroked. In this way, attending tactile sensations
could increase awareness of the arm’s true position in
space and afford better detection of perceptual mismatches
between seen and felt stroking, and therefore impede the
emergence of distortions.
This experimental strategy is consistent with mounting
evidence showing that task instructions can influence perception (cf. Brass & de Houwer, 2017). For example,
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attentional instructions influence the dynamics of perception in the context of binocular rivalry and ambiguous figures (Liebert & Burk, 1985; Paffen & Alais, 2011; Toppino,
2003). Similarly, one sensory modality can dominate the
others and yield cross-model biases (Cao et al., 2019). A
similar effect can be observed in the context of body ownership, where sight can exert great influence over proprioception in a manner that changes how tactile sensations are
interpreted and ascribed to body representations (Botvinick
& Cohen, 1998; Carey et al., 2019; Chancel et al., 2021;
Hagura et al., 2007; Holmes et al., 2006; Maselli & Slater,
2013; Pavani et al., 2000; Ponzo et al., 2018; Willis et al.,
2021; but see Guterstam et al., 2013). The assumption that
researchers can alter this preferential treatment is therefore
central to the present work.
Ample evidence highlights the centrality of attention in
multisensory integration (Fernández et al., 2015; Koelewijn
et al., 2010; Mozolic, Hugenschmidt, et al., 2008; Mozolic,
Joyner, et al., 2008; Senkowski et al., 2005; Talsma et al.,
2007, 2010; Talsma & Woldorff, 2005). Attending to a specific modality typically tunes down the processing of other
modalities; whereby, unattended sensory signals hardly
influence perception (Knudsen, 2007; Laurienti et al.,
2002; Mozolic, Hugenschmidt, et al., 2008; Mozolic,
Joyner, et al., 2008). As a case in point, providing instructions to attend to different sensory information interferes
with the otherwise automatic sensory predominance of
vision during the McGurk effect (Buchan & Munhall,
2011b). Likewise, suggestions to prioritise auditory input
leads to a weaker McGurk illusion in highly hypnotisable
individuals (Déry et al., 2014; Lifshitz et al., 2013).
Consistent with these findings, previous work alludes to
the direct role of attentional factors in the RHI (Tsakiris,
2017). For instance, individuals showing higher interoceptive sensitivity—a predisposition to attend to, perceive, and
report internal bodily signals such as heartbeats accurately—typically experience a weaker RHI (Schauder
et al., 2015; Tsakiris et al., 2011; but see Horváth et al.,
2020).2 Note that although researchers have historically
employed the term interoception to describe “visceroception” (internal perception of viscera—heart, gut, lungs,
etc.), the term is increasingly conceptualised more broadly
as to also include proprioception and skin sensations
(Björnsdotter et al., 2010; Cameron, 2001, 2002; Ceunen
et al., 2016; Craig, 2002; von Mohr & Fotopoulou, 2019).
Furthermore, the sense of touch serves as an auxiliary proprioceptive cue (Blanchard et al., 2011; Moscatelli et al.,
2016, 2019). Therefore, in the present work, rather than
operationalising interoception as a trait or ability, we
attempted to manipulate it via explicit instructions. We
instructed participants to either focus their attention on the
tactile sensation of their real hand or on external visual
information (i.e., the sight of the rubber hand; “exteroception”). Given that interoceptive and exteroceptive cues
appear
antagonistic
(Tsakiris,
2017),
this

3
experimental procedure should modulate the illusion such
that participants will report a stronger illusion with visual
instructions, which would prioritise the exteroceptive
information.

Method
Participants
We used convenience sampling and recruited 38 undergraduate students through the psychology participant pool system at McGill University—data collection stopped at the
end of the semester. Each participant gave informed consent
and received two credits for their participation. We excluded
five participants due to requests from participants to stop the
experiment, excessive knowledge about the goals of the
experiment, or experimenter error. For purposes of analysis,
we kept data from 33 participants (Mage = 20.6 years,
SDage = 1.4 years, 70% females, 79% right-handed, 58%
White, 24% Asian, 6% Other; demographic data was lost for
four participants). We provide the factor score data and analyses on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/
qc2hm/). The Research Ethics Board at McGill University
approved this study prior to data collection.

Materials
The fake hand consists of a realistic silicon anatomical
prosthesis including the right hand, forearm, arm, and
shoulder (produced by Milsuite FX Inc.). A self-made separator wrapped with a silver-pink cloth occluded the real
right hand of participants from their view. Participants 1 to
13 indicated their responses on a paper questionnaire displaying eight-item visual analogues ranging from 0 (“I do
not agree at all”) to 7 (“I agree completely”) following
statements such as, “I felt as if the hand I saw was my
hand.” Participants 14 to 33 instead indicated their
responses on the computer—to reduce paper consumption—by typing a number from 0 to 7 in a similar fashion,
but without a visual analogue. In brief, the questionnaire
assesses changes in phenomenological experience as a
function of our experimental conditions. To design it, we
adapted 35 questions from other researchers adopting the
RHI methodology (Farmer et al., 2012; Gonzalez-Franco
et al., 2014; Guterstam et al., 2011; Longo et al., 2008;
Rohde et al., 2011; Tsakiris et al., 2011).

Procedure
The experimenter explained the general goals of the study
to participants as “examining the cognitive dimensions of
body ownership illusions” and that the experiment aimed
to “explore body sensations and body perceptions.” Next,
they signed a consent form prior to the experiment. We
noted down participant demographics, after which participants entered the testing room. Participants then sat on a
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Figure 1. Rubber hand illusion setup.

Left: experimental setup with fake silicon arm between the two real hands and the occluder. Right: participant view during synchronous stroking.

chair in front of a table supporting the experimental apparatus, and we positioned their right arm on the table on the
right of an occluding partition so that their hand and arm
were out of sight. They similarly positioned their left hand
on the table, but in a clearly visible fashion in their left
field of view. We then placed a fake silicon arm on the left
of the occluder so that the shoulder section of the fake arm
leaned against the frontal part of the right shoulder of participants. The angle of the fake arm differed from the natural position of the real arm by about 5 cm—the width of the
partition. We then put a sheet to cover their shoulders to
visually mask the distinction between their real arm and
the fake arm. After giving proper instructions about the
procedure, we synchronously stimulated both the real and
fake arms with small paintbrushes for approximately 2 min
to induce the illusion (Figure 1).
Participants underwent the illusion across four counterbalanced experimental conditions: (a) cognitive load and
attend visual signal, (b) no load and attend visual signal,
(c) cognitive load and attend tactile sensation, and (d) no
load and attend tactile sensation.3 During cognitive load,
the experimenter exposed participants to a string of characters composed of six random digits and letters (e.g.,
A7D3X2) that appeared for approximately 1 s on a computer screen. Participants had to remember this character
string until after the stimulation was over, after which they
had to spell out the character string they had received (i.e.,
about 2 min).4 In the no load condition, participants merely
had to remember a string of characters composed of the
same random number or letter (e.g., EEEEEE). Regarding
the attended sensory signal manipulation we instructed
participants to attend to their visual perception of the stroking of the hand in front of them in the visual signal
condition:

Please attend to the sight of the hand in front of you while it is
being stroke until further instructions. Please do not attend to
your real hand or to its tactile sensations. Attend to the hand
you see.

In the tactile signal condition, we instructed participants to focus on the tactile sensation of the paintbrush
touching their real hand while keeping their gaze focused
on the fake hand:
Please attend to the tactile sensation of your real hand while it
is being stroke until further instructions. Continue to gaze at
the fake hand but do not focus on it. Attend to the sense of
touch on your real hand.

After the stimulation, participants filled out a selfadministered questionnaire concerning their experience for
each of the four conditions, so that each participant filled
out four questionnaires in total. This questionnaire assessed
various dimensions relating to the phenomenology associated with the RHI. At the end, we debriefed each participant. In total, the experiment took approximately 45 min.

Factor analysis
In the current study, we first carry out a factor analysis
rather than using the pre-established dimensions of body
ownership identified by Longo et al. (2008). Several reasons motivate this approach. First, independent researchers have yet to validate the questionnaire of Longo et al.
(2008), providing an opportunity to corroborate the proposed structure of body ownership in a different sample.
Second, there were known limitations to the Longo et al.
(2008) methodology (cf. Fabrigar et al., 1999). For
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instance, Longo et al. (2008) used Principal Component
Analysis (PCA), while it would have been more appropriate to use Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) due to the
implicit goal of generalising the findings to the population
level rather than restraining the interpretation to the sample level (Fabrigar et al., 1999; Field et al., 2012). Similarly,
given the intercorrelation between the factors, the factor
rotation should have been oblique, as opposed to orthogonal (Fabrigar et al., 1999; Field et al., 2012).
Therefore, carrying out our own factor analyses
improves the validity of the psychometric dimensions used
in this study. We also include additional items used in more
recent RHI studies that are not part of the questionnaire
developed by Longo et al. (2008), making it that much
more critical to conduct new factor analyses and therefore
validate the relevant constructs. We note however that
given our use of a different experimental design and additional items, this factor analysis serves as a rather limited
and context-specific “validation” of Longo and colleagues
(2008). Readers should appraise the theoretical value of
this analysis accordingly.
Following the work of Longo et al. (2008), we first
attempted to replicate their psychometric findings using an
identical analytical procedure: a PCA with orthogonal varimax rotation.5 Here, we pooled data from our repeated
measures design. This strategy aims to increase the number of data points to benefit the identification of factors
(Schopflocher & Ulrich, 2005). Thus, we treated each data
point separately—a procedure that yielded 132 observations in total. Obviously, this approach voids independence between data points and assumes that we should
recover the same latent structure across all conditions.
However, the idea that our top-down factors would dramatically change the phenomenology of the RHI such that
it would modify the latent structure seems rather implausible. Furthermore, based on Monte Carlo simulations,
between 60 and 100 observations are adequate for high
items communalities values (⩾.6), whereas with lower
communalities (~.5), adequate samples ought to contain
between 100 and 200 observations (de Winter et al., 2009;
Fabrigar et al., 1999; MacCallum et al., 1999, 2001;
Mundfrom et al., 2005; Russell, 2002). In turn, these predictions hold when the ratio of items to factors is medium
to high (3.3–6.7), though the higher the ratio the better.
Given our 35-item average communalities of .60 and our
high item:factor ratio of 8.75, 132 observations therefore
seem quite adequate.
Our PCA results for the most part replicated those of
Longo et al. (2008). We thus followed up with a
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to validate the latent
structure of the questionnaire developed by Longo et al.
(2008). We accordingly hypothesised a four-factor solution and excluded items that loaded less than .5 or that
were not included in the original analysis. The CFA comprised 21 of the questions from Longo et al. (2008) and
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assumed four factors based on their four-factor model for
synchronous stroking only, namely, embodiment of the
rubber hand, loss of own hand, movement, and affect. We
specified the model as follows: embodiment → Items 1–8,
15–16; loss of hand → Items 14, 19, 28–30; movement →
Items 12, 17, 34; and affect → Items 20–22 (average communalities of these 21 items = .68; item:factor ratio = 5.25).
However, the model poorly fitted the data (but see van
Prooijen & van der Kloot, 2001, for a discussion on the
relationship between CFA fit and factor structures obtained
through factor analysis). We therefore opted to follow up
with an EFA to clarify the underlying structure from our
data set. We performed EFA using the Minimal Residual
method to extract the factors, and again we used an oblique
(i.e., “oblimin”) rotation due to the intercorrelation
between our factors (Fabrigar et al., 1999; Field et al.,
2012). We obtained the weighted standardised factor
scores using Bartlett’s method (as suggested by DiStefano
et al., 2009, for oblique rotation). These analyses were
completed in R version 3.4.2 (R Core Team, 2021) using
packages nFactors (for the scree plot; Raiche & Magis,
2020), psych (for PCA and EFA; Revelle, 2018) lavaan
(for CFA; Rosseel, 2012), and effsize (for effect sizes;
Torchiano, 2020).

Experimental analyses
Using the weighted standardised factor scores obtained
from the EFA, we then used hierarchical linear regression
models to determine whether the four factors identified by
the EFA—that is, embodiment of rubber hand, loss of own
hand, feeling of having two right hands, and affect—varied
as a function of instructions and cognitive load (Gelman &
Hill, 2006). This analytical approach proves to be welladjusted for repeated measures designs, to the point of outperforming the classic analysis of variance (ANOVA)
model (Boisgontier & Cheval, 2016; Quené & van den
Bergh, 2004). Within our framework, the embodiment component refers to feelings of ownership and control over the
fake hand; the loss of own hand component indexes loss of
control and feelings of numbness over the real hand; the
feeling of having two right hands component corresponds
to the impression of feeling both the rubber hand and the
real hand simultaneously; and finally, the affective dimension follows from questions pertaining to the pleasantness
of the experience. Here, instructions (i.e., visual vs. tactile)
and cognitive load (i.e., no load vs. load) were included in
a stepwise fashion as fixed factors, while participants were
included as random factors. We selected the best fitting
model based on a likelihood-ratio chi-square test and the
Bayes Information Criterion (BIC). Moreover, we relied on
Bayes Factors to evaluate how evidence weights in favour
of the null hypothesis versus the alternative one
(Wagenmakers, 2007). We estimated Bayes Factors via the
BIC using the following equation: BF01 = eΔBIC10/2. We fitted
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Table 1. Confirmatory factor analysis results.
χ2

Current study

χ2/df

Ratio of χ2 to df < 2 or 3

Reference valuea
b

df

600.08

183

3.28

p

CFI

TLI

RMSEA

SRMR

>.05

⩾.95

⩾.95

<.06–.08

⩽.08

.79

.76

<.001

.13

.11

CFI: comparative fit index; TLI: Tucker–Lewis index; RMSEA: root mean square error of approximation; SRMR: standardised root mean square residual.
a
As proposed by Schreiber et al. (2006).
b
Excludes items not used by Longo et al. (2008) and those that loaded less than .5 in their study. It includes 21 of the questions from Longo et al.
(2008) and four factors based on their four-factor model (for synchronous stroking): (a) embodiment of rubber hand, (b) loss of own hand, (c)
movement, and (d) affect.

the hierarchical linear regression models using the
MATLAB (MathWorks inc., Version R2020a) fitglme
function.

Results
PCA
In total, 11 of the 27 items used by Longo et al. (2008) did
not load on the same factor or also loaded on an additional
factor in our PCA results (our Items 1, 17–19, 21, 23–26,
32, and 34; Longo’s Items 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 21, and 23–
26). See Table S1 for complete loadings and comparison
with Longo et al. (2008).

CFA
The data did not meet the assumption of multivariate normality for CFA (i.e., the variables were not normally distributed). We accordingly used a robust maximum
likelihood estimator with Huber-White standard errors and
a scaled test statistic (asymptotically equal to the YuanBentler test statistic). The results of the CFA are available
in Table 1. Ultimately, none of the indices meet the commonly accepted minimum criteria and revealed poor fit of
the data (Schreiber et al., 2006).

EFA
Following the poor fit of the CFA, we opted for an EFA. We
verified the sampling adequacy of the individual items with
the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure. We removed
three items with KMO values smaller than .7 (considered
mediocre by Kaiser, 1974): Items 22, 27, and 35. All other
values were greater or equal to .7. We additionally removed
three items with fewer than five correlations greater than .3
(Items 9, 31, and 33). Obtaining a determinant of the correlation matrix greater than 1e-5 (a common rule of thumb,
Field et al., 2012) would have required us to drop an additional 13 items with correlations greater than .7 (Items no
1–8, 14, 16, 18, 19, and 30). We deemed this solution
impracticable given that such a high attrition would represent close to 50% of our questions. Instead, we opted to

simply drop one extra item: Question 4 because its wording
was virtually identical to Item 2 and correlated with it at .9
(indicating the question may have been redundant). Overall,
this resulted in the exclusion of seven items (4, 9, 22, 27,
31, 33, and 35), leaving us with 28 items (average communalities of these 28 items = .65; item:factor ratio = 7). This
procedure leaves us with a suboptimal correlation matrix
determinant of 6.87e-12, though the overall KMO measure
of sampling adequacy was a hair more than .9—a reliable
score (Kaiser, 1974). However, this solution entails that the
high multicollinearity of the data set represents a limitation
of the current factor analysis because it entails that most
items load onto the same construct. Bartlett’s test of sphericity, x2(378) = 3,105.945, p < .001, confirmed the interitem correlations were large enough for the analysis. Five
components had eigenvalues more than Kaiser’s criterion
of 1 and together explained 70.92% of the variance, though
the point of inflexion on a scree plot justified keeping three
components that explained 62.37% of the variance. We
decided to retain four components explaining 66.70% of
the variance in light of both Kaiser’s criterion and the scree
plot, as well as of previous findings by Longo et al. (2008).
A four-factor solution revealed that although residuals
distributed normally, more than 50% of residuals (85.71%)
were larger than .05, and that the root-mean-square residual (.21) was more than .08, putting these values above the
commonly accepted limits. Field et al. (2012) suggests that
such results encourage extracting more factors; however,
extracting more factors only worsened both issues, and
extracting fewer factors did little to help reach the acceptable values. This issue likely reflects our low sample size.
Figure 2 graphically displays the model. Figure 3 displays
how the EFA model provided a much better BIC fit
(–691.09) than the CFA model (10,351.36), while also
explaining marginally more variance (based on 10,000
bootstraps per model). The EFA scale overall had high
internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .95, 95% confidence
interval [CI] = [0.94, 0.96]).
The table of loadings/pattern matrix (Table 2) suggests
the four components represent (a) embodiment of rubber
hand, (b) loss of own hand, (c) feeling of having two right
hands, and (d) affect. See the Supplemental Material,
Table S2 for the equivalent table of loadings without

Thériault et al.
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Figure 2. Exploratory Factor Analysis.

Numbers on the left represent item numbers; numbers on the lines represent item loadings on their primary factor or intercorrelation between
factors. The red lines represent negative loadings.

excluded items (for those interested in where those would
have loaded), Table S3 for the table of correlations, and
Table S4 for the structure matrix. The Cronbach’s alphas

for the four factors were as follows: embodiment of rubber hand (.95, 95% CI = [0.94, 0.97]), loss of own hand
(.88, 95% CI = [0.85, 0.91]), feeling of having two right
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Figure 3. Model comparison: confirmatory versus exploratory factor.

Left panel: the large BIC difference suggests a much better fit for Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) than Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Right
panel: distributions of bootstrapped (10,000 samples each) total variances explained by the CFA and EFA models, respectively. Note that for the
CFA, 250 bootstrapped variances explained (out of 10,000) were greater than one due to the bootstrapping process, so were excluded for this
figure. The overlapping distributions suggest both the CFA and EFA models explain comparable total variances, with the EFA explaining marginally
more. BIC: Bayes Information Criterion.

hands (.72, 95% CI = [0.63, 0.81]), and affect (.67, 95%
CI = [0.56, 0.78]).
Embodiment of rubber hand. “Embodiment of rubber hand”
emerged as expected, encompassing most items from previous studies, except that according to the PCA by Longo
et al. (2008), Items 7, 18, and 19 should have loaded on the
“Loss of own hand” factor, and Item 11 should have loaded
on “Loss of own hand” as well according to theorisation
by Guterstam et al. (2011).
Loss of own hand. “Loss of own hand” emerged as expected,
including many items from previous studies, except that
according to the PCA by Longo et al. (2008), Item 30
should have loaded on the “Embodiment” factor, Item 17
should have loaded on the “Movement” factor, and Items
24–26 should not have loaded anywhere (as in their study
it only loaded on a “Deafference” component that only
emerged in asynchronous stroking conditions).
Feeling of having two right hands. The structure emerging
from this third factor does not seem to reflect the third factor identified by Longo et al. (2008), “Movement.” In fact,
Items 12 and 13 were not used by Longo, but according to
Guterstam et al. (2011), these two questions should belong
to a dimension they named “Feeling of having two right
hands.” It seems like in the current experiment, this dimension replaced the “Movement” dimension. Only two of our
items previously loaded on the “Movement” dimension in
Longo’s research (Items 17 and 34). It seems that Item 17
now loads on the “Loss of own hand” dimension, associating the drift to losing own’s hand. Note that we did not

include Longo’s question: “. . . it seemed like I had three
hands,” which previously loaded on “Movement” as well
because we thought it was similar enough to our Item 12
(feeling like having two right hands more or less implies
feeling three hands in total). Furthermore, Item 34 previously loaded on “Movement” as well, whereas here it did
not load anywhere, perhaps because we used the modified
wording by Guterstam et al. (2011), which added the specification that the rubber hand was “visually” drifting
towards the real hand.
Affect. Although we had to remove Item 22, the “Affect”
factor emerged as expected, with the difference that Item
23 had previously not loaded on any factor in the PCA by
Longo et al. (2008).
Items with no loadings greater or equal to .5. According to
the PCA by Longo et al. (2008), Item 6 should have loaded
on the “Embodiment” factor. Item 10 may have been
expected to load on “Loss of own hand” in light of the
theorisation by Guterstam et al. (2011). In the study by
Longo et al. (2008), Item 21 loaded on the “Affect” dimension. Item 34 may have also been expected to load on the
“Movement” factor according to them; however, we used
a modified wording version (Guterstam et al., 2011; Rohde
et al., 2011) that was classified as a control statement (perhaps because of the emphasis on a “visual” drift).

Experimental condition
We relied on hierarchical linear regression models to determine whether the instructions and load manipulations
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Table 2. Factor loadings/pattern matrix (Items 4, 9, 22, 27, 31, 33, and 35 excluded) for Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with
oblique (“oblimin”) rotation and four factors.
Item no During the block . . .

Expected
dimension

1

Ownershipa

2
3
5
6
7
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
23
24
25
26
28
29

I felt the touch of the brush on the
hand I saw.
I felt as if the hand I saw was my hand.
It seemed like the hand I saw was part
of my body.

Ownershipb
Embodiment of
rubber handc
(Ownershipd)
It seemed like the hand I saw belonged Embodiment of
to me.
rubber handc
(Ownershipd)
It seemed like the hand I saw began to Embodiment of
resemble my real hand.
rubber handc
(Ownershipd)
It seemed like I could have moved the Loss of own
hand I saw if I had wanted.
handc
It seemed like I was in control of the
Embodiment of
hand I saw.
rubber handc
I felt the touch of the brush on my
Disownership of
(real) hand.
the real handa
It no longer felt like my (real) hand
Disownership of
belonged to my body.
the real handa
It felt as if I had two right hands.
Feeling of having
two right handsa
I felt the touch of the brush on both
Feeling of having
hands at the same time.
two right handsa
It seemed like the touch I felt was
Embodiment of
caused by the brush touching the hand rubber handc
I saw.
It seemed like the hand I saw was in the Embodiment of
location where my hand was.
rubber handc
(Locationd)
It seemed like my hand was in the
Embodiment of
location where the hand I saw was.
rubber handc
(Locationd)
I felt as if my (real) hand were drifting Movementc,e
towards the left (towards the fake
hand).
It seemed like I couldn’t really tell
Loss of own
where my (real) hand was.
handc
It seemed like my (real) hand had
Loss of own
disappeared.
handc
I found the experience enjoyable.
Affectc
I found the experience interesting.
Affectc
I found myself liking the hand I saw.
No loadingc
I had the sensation of pins and needles Deafferencec
(asynchronous)
in my hand.
I had the sensation that my hand was Deafferencec
numb.
(asynchronous)
It seemed like the experience of my
Deafferencec
hands was less vivid than normal.
(asynchronous)
It seemed like I was unable to move my Loss of own
hand.
handc
It seemed like I could have moved my Loss of own
hand if I had wanted.
handc

Embodiment of Loss of
Two right Affect
rubber hand
own hand hands

Communalities

0.853

0.818

0.931
0.907

0.852
0.84

0.821

0.767
0.525

0.893

0.775

0.877

0.756
0.391

0.509

0.531

0.61
0.673

0.557

0.667

0.628

0.857

0.784

0.523

0.541

0.855

0.798
0.528

0.432

0.546

0.633

0.732

0.79
0.857

0.701

0.819
0.306
0.566
0.468

0.784

0.625

0.635

0.519

0.71

0.631

−0.633

0.474

0.567

(Continued)
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Table 2. (Continued)
Item no During the block . . .

Expected
dimension

30

Embodiment of
rubber handc
Control
statementa,c,e
Control
statementa,e,
movementc

32
34

It seemed like my hand was out of my
control.
It felt as if my (real) hand were turning
“rubbery.”
It appeared (visually) as if the fake hand
was drifting to the right (towards my
real hand).
Eigenvalues
Percentage variance explained

Embodiment of Loss of
Two right Affect
rubber hand
own hand hands
0.613

Communalities
0.54
0.486
0.242

8.826
31.5

5.021
17.9

1.757
6.3

1.568
5.6

Component loadings less than 0.5 are not displayed. Items were adapted from the following: aGuterstam et al. (2011), bGonzalez-Franco et al.
(2014), cLongo et al. (2008), dTsakiris et al. (2011), and eRohde et al. (2011).

Figure 4. Embodiment factor.

Averaged standardised factor scores for the “Embodiment of rubber hand” dimension (y-axis). In the original scale, participants could choose
between 0 (“I do not agree at all”) and 7 (“I agree completely”). Regression analyses revealed that Instructions were a statistically reliable predictor of
embodiment, (β = 0.5, SE = 0.1, 95% CI = [0.29, 0.7]. Error bars represent 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals.

influenced feelings of embodiment, increased feelings of
having two right hands, affective components of the RHI,
and reduced feelings of one’s own hand (see Figures 4 to 7).

The best fitting model for predicting feelings of embodiment revealed that instructions was the sole statistically reliable predictor (β = 0.5, SE = 0.1, 95% CI = [0.29, 0.7]; see
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Figure 5. Affect factor.

Averaged standardised factor scores for the “Affect” dimension (y-axis). In the original scale, participants could choose between 0 (“I do not agree at
all”) and 7 (“I agree completely”). Regression analyses revealed that load was a statistically reliable predictor of affect (β = –0.17, SE = 0.09, 95% CI =
[–0.35, –0.009]). Error bars represent 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals.

Tables S5 and S6). For comparison, the Cohen’s d for the
difference between visual and tactile instructions revealed a
medium effect size of 0.51. This outcome indicates that tactile instructions decrease feelings of embodiment in the RHI
relative to visual ones. In turn, however, Bayes factor analysis comparing the baseline model against the alternative
model, which comprised only the load variable, revealed
that evidence weighted in favour of the null hypothesis
(BF01 = 11.48). Corroborating previous work, our data indicate that the load manipulation did not influence feelings of
embodiment (Fahey et al., 2018). Furthermore, we observed
no influence of instructions and load on the feeling of having
two right hands and loss of feeling towards one’s own hand.
In both cases, the data were best fitted by the baseline model
which solely comprised the intercept (see Tables S7 and S8).
Bayes factor confirmed this assessment whereby evidence
largely supported the null model for the feeling of having
two right hands against the load (BF01 = 9.9) and instruction
(BF01 = 10.02) manipulations. Likewise, evidence also

supported the null model for losing feeling in one’s own
hand with respect to the load manipulation (BF01 = 11.13),
though evidence was ambiguous regarding the instruction
manipulation (BF01 = 2.11). Finally, we observed that the
best fitting model for predicting the affective component
solely included load as a reliable predictor (β = –0.17,
SE = 0.09, 95% CI = [–0.35, –0.009]; see Tables S9 and
S10). However, the Cohen’s d for the difference between
load and no load indicated a small effect size of 0.16. This
outcome shows that cognitive load reduces this dimension
of the RHI, albeit weakly.

Discussion
The present study aimed to explore the influence of topdown components, such as attention and working memory,
on the RHI. To this end, we investigated whether the illusion
is vulnerable to the availability of working memory
resources by manipulating a cognitive load, and by varying
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Figure 6. Loss of one’s own hand factor.

Averaged standardised factor scores for the “Loss of own hand” dimension (y-axis). In the original scale, participants could choose between 0 (“I do
not agree at all”) and 7 (“I agree completely”). There were no significant effects. Error bars represent 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals.

task instructions with regards to the attended sensory event.
Our approach followed previous work that highlighted various phenomenological dimensions of the RHI (Longo et al.,
2008). In this regard, the CFA derived from this work was
suboptimal, while the EFA provided better fit of the data.
This improvement likely follows from the additional items
we used in our research. We predicted that reducing the
availability of cognitive resources and instructing participants to attend to somatosensory sensations would lessen
the magnitude of the RHI. Our results partly support these
predictions as task instructions modulated feelings of
embodiment, wherein individuals reported lower feelings of
embodiment towards the fake arm when they focused on
tactile as opposed to visual sensations. In this regard, the
experience of embodiment is broad and encompasses several subcomponents, such as feelings of ownership and control over the fake hand, or impressions that the felt touch
emerges from the fake hand (i.e., referral of touch; de

Vignemont, 2011). Hence, shifting attention to different
sensory inputs shapes the phenomenology of body ownership. Conversely, our cognitive load manipulation solely
affected the pleasantness of the experience—a somewhat
unexpected outcome that likely highlights the unpleasantness of cognitive effort. In this regard, our findings replicated previous work in showing the RHI hardly relies on
top-down cognitive resources (Fahey et al., 2018).
Furthermore, our variables did not influence other dimensions, namely, feelings of having two right hands and of losing one’s own hand. Null findings are notoriously difficult
to interpret (e.g., Wagenmakers, 2007). Here, we resorted to
a Bayesian approach to evaluate whether evidence supports
the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2014). With the exception of
feelings of losing one’s own hand where evidence was
inconclusive, Bayes factors supported the null hypothesis in
all cases. In sum, these results contribute to a growing body
of evidence suggesting that various higher-order cognitive
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Figure 7. Feeling of having two right hands factor.

Averaged standardised factor scores for the “Feeling of having two right hands” dimension (y-axis). In the original scale, participants could choose
between 0 (“I do not agree at all”) and 7 (“I agree completely”). There were no significant effects. Error bars represent 95% bootstrapped confidence
intervals.

processes, including attention, can modulate the RHI
(Dempsey-Jones & Kritikos, 2014; Kilteni et al., 2015).

Exploring the effects of task instructions
Our findings emphasise the influence of task instructions
and attention in shaping the phenomenology of the embodiment of rubber hand dimension. We speculate that these
modulations reflect the putative central role of visual processing in bodily self-consciousness (Deroy et al., 2016;
Faivre et al., 2015).6 Prevailing views argue that the combination of visual and tactile inputs overwrites prior proprioceptive knowledge, thereby altering body representations
during the RHI (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al.,
2004; Hagura et al., 2007; Pavani et al., 2000). The current
work expands this viewpoint by showing how focusing
attention to visual inputs heightens feelings of embodiment in the context of the RHI compared to when individuals instead focus on somatosensations. This outcome

intimates that the emergence of such feelings follows
from the attentional prioritisation of visual information
towards the prosthesis, thereby facilitating its integration
within existing body representations (though we note illusions of body ownership can ultimately arise without the
contribution of vision, e.g., in the somatic version of the
RHI, Ehrsson et al., 2005; also see Ehrsson, 2020, for a
review).
This interpretation aligns with previous viewpoints
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Carey et al., 2019; Chancel
et al., 2021; Hagura et al., 2007; Maselli & Slater, 2013;
Pavani et al., 2000; Ponzo et al., 2018). Conversely, focusing on tactile information seemingly grounds prior body
representations—for example, by allowing participants to
better notice discrepancies between seen and felt touch—
therefore impeding the ability of visual inputs to induce
further alterations. Indeed, the sense of touch can act as an
auxiliary proprioceptive cue (Blanchard et al., 2011;
Moscatelli et al., 2016, 2019).
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These results dovetail previous findings showing that
greater awareness of internal bodily signals (“interoception”) similarly weakens the RHI (Schauder et al., 2015;
Tsakiris et al., 2011). By improving awareness of the true
body position (through increased attention to tactile
inputs), enhanced somatosensory processing may have
consolidated a firmer and clearer body representation–
that is, less prone to distortions–thus leading to attenuated
feelings of embodiment of the fake hand. Our findings
therefore highlight how the interplay between visual and
tactile inputs, mediated through attention processes,
shapes a core phenomenological dimension of body
ownership.
Hence, in the context of multisensory processing, attention seemingly influences the RHI by biasing the competition between sensory signals, which impairs the processing
of the unattended signal—a phenomenon known as crossmodal deactivation (Fernández et al., 2015; Knudsen,
2007; Laurienti et al., 2002; Mozolic, Hugenschmidt,
et al., 2008; Mozolic, Joyner, et al., 2008). Cross-modal
deactivation therefore represents a likely mechanism by
which selective attention interferes with multisensory integration and alters embodiment within the RHI as a function of attention instructions. Specifically, focusing on
sight downplays somatosensations and prioritises information about the prosthesis, thereby yielding a stronger illusion. Conversely, attending to tactile sensations boosts the
processing and the integration of somatosensory signals at
the expense of the otherwise dominating visual sensory
input (Sinnett et al., 2007). In sum, limited integration of
visual information leads to a partial breakdown of the illusion—that is, visual information fails to override prior
body signals and representations.

The influence of cognitive load
Contrary to our original predictions, cognitive load hardly
influenced the primary phenomenological components of
interest. This outcome is consistent with a recent study that
employed a similar approach to assess the role of working
capacities in the context of the RHI (Fahey et al., 2018).
While one could argue that our cognitive load manipulation
insufficiently taxed cognitive resources or that this outcome stems from low statistical power given the modest
effect size of cognitive load over multisensory integration
(Buchan & Munhall, 2011a, 2012), evidence favoured the
null hypothesis rather than indicating ambiguity, per Bayes
factor analysis. Hence, working memory resources likely
play a negligible role in the actual integration of visuotactile information in the context of the RHI (Fahey et al.,
2018). Nevertheless, our cognitive load task was reliable in
altering the affective component of the RHI, leading to
lower ratings of pleasantness. This marginal effect may be
due to the cognitive load interfering with the capacity to
appraise the effect, thus leading participants to report lower
pleasantness of the experience. An alternative, perhaps
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simpler explanation is that people usually prefer tasks that
are easier, whereas the cognitive load component understandably makes the task more difficult and less pleasant.
Our results have theoretical and methodological implications. From a theoretical perspective, our present findings are consistent with, and extend, previous RHI studies
(Fahey et al., 2018; Kilteni et al., 2015; Tsakiris, 2017). We
also replicated previous research efforts concerned with
the role of attentional processes in cross-modal sensory
integration (Buchan & Munhall, 2011b; Déry et al., 2014;
Fernández et al., 2015; Hartcher-O’Brien et al., 2017;
Koelewijn et al., 2010; Lifshitz et al., 2013; Mozolic,
Hugenschmidt, et al., 2008; Mozolic, Joyner, et al., 2008;
Senkowski et al., 2005; Talsma et al., 2007, 2010; Talsma
& Woldorff, 2005). Specifically, this study illustrates the
importance for existing models of body ownership to
accommodate and integrate attentional factors in developing a more comprehensive understanding of bodily selfconsciousness. We also note that bodily self-consciousness
differs from other forms of multisensory integration, as it
relies, for example, on both somatosensory and external
(visual) stimuli, rather than on purely exteroceptive stimuli
(Blanke et al., 2015). From a methodological perspective,
our results further support the influence of task instructions in the RHI. Subsequently, we encourage researchers
to heed the importance of instructions and attention in this
experimental approach.

Limitations
Our study suffers from a few limitations. It is possible that
our load manipulation insufficiently taxed cognitive
resources, which would explain why this variable revealed
no effect over the RHI, therefore rendering the interpretation of this experimental condition difficult. Moreover, the
experimenter manually controlled exposure to experimental visual character strings, introducing variation in latency
exposure across participants, which might have added an
additional (though trivial) source of noise. Also, questions
from the body ownership questionnaire followed a nonrandom order, which may have introduced an order effects
bias. However, any such effects would likely affect all
conditions in the same way, rendering them orthogonal to
our experimental manipulations. Our factor structure was
similar to previous work, which entails that order effects
biases, if any, were negligible, and factors that included
items presented later were not necessarily less reliable.
Finally, recent work reveals that expectation significantly
influence self-reports of body ownership distortions in the
RHI, thereby indicating that demand characteristics are
central to this experimental approach (Lush, 2020). While
we cannot exclude this possibility here, demand characteristics were reported while contrasting synchronous and
asynchronous stroking conditions. Due to our already
packed two-by-two experimental design, we opted not to
use asynchronous stroking as a baseline and instead
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focused our approach on relative differences between cognitive load and instructions manipulations. It therefore
remains unclear how expectancy could have influenced
the outcome of the present work, especially given that participants were blind to the purpose of our experimental
manipulations.
Other limitations apply to our factor analysis procedures as well, as we drew our conclusions from a modest
sample size and various explanatory components of a
factor analysis approach, which obviously limits the generalisability of our findings (however, our average communalities and item:factor ratio were high). Pooling data
from repeated measures and from the different conditions
potentially limits the interpretability and generalisability
of our conclusions by not directly accounting for betweengroup and within-subject variance (i.e., observations are
not independent; Reise et al., 2005). Different experimental conditions could lead to slightly different phenomenological experiences, and though our collapsing of the data
should average any such difference, this procedure contributes extra noise in the identification of factors (but also
see the possibility of a Simpson’s paradox; Kievit et al.,
2013). Factor scores distributed pseudo-normally and the
determinant of the correlation matrix, the proportion of
residuals greater than .05, and the root-mean-square residual fell outside recommended value ranges, which raises
some concerns about the goodness-of-fit of the EFA.
Moreover, a low determinant of the correlation matrix suggests multicollinearity, which can make it more difficult to
determine the unique contribution of the correlated items
to a given factor. However, this is less of a problem for
factor analysis, unless it leads to Heywood cases. Overall,
the implications of these values not meeting the highest
diagnostic requirements are that it can limit the usefulness
and interpretability of the model. Yet, models rarely meet
these diagnostic requirements perfectly, thereby highlighting the benefits of model selection (Preacher et al., 2013).
In addition, the impact of high multicollinearity in the data
should prove to be minimal because the oblique rotation
teases apart the different components and align those that
correlate. Finally, our use of a different experimental
design and additional items also limit strong comparisons
to Longo et al. (2008). In this regard, our research effort
primarily serves as a preliminary exploration.

Conclusion
Unlike focusing on tactile sensations, attending to visual
aspects of the rubber hand elicits a stronger illusion.
Furthermore, increased cognitive load makes the RHI less
enjoyable. Our study suggests that attention plays a central
role in the RHI. Indeed, we found that task instructions
regarding the attended modality influenced the strength of
embodiment over the rubber hand. Specifically, emphasis
on somatosensory sensations tends to weaken the overall
experience compared to emphasis on visual sensations
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because instructions seem to decrease feelings of embodiment relative to the fake hand.
Our current findings have important implications for
future research on multisensory integration and for studies
employing RHI-like methodologies. First, these results
contribute to our understanding of the role of attention in
multisensory processes. Second, attention to particular
features (e.g., visual vs. tactile aspects) may introduce considerable variation in body ownership. Thus, researchers
should attempt to more fully account for attentional factors
in existing models of body ownership. Third, and more
specifically, participants may focus on one feature of the
experience at the expense of another (e.g., proprioception
or somatosensory sensations). Thus, it would behove
researchers to provide explicit instructions emphasising
visual representation, to maximise the illusory effect. In
conclusion, our findings contribute to the debate over the
role of top-down, higher-order cognitive factors in illusions of body ownership and multisensory integration.
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Notes
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Note, however, that a diminished illusion can still arise
without synchronous stroking or tactile stimulation (e.g.,
Samad et al., 2015).
Note that there are known limitations to heartbeat detection
tasks and mental tracking methods, such as low reliability
with few samples or influence of extraneous factors (Brener
& Ring, 2016; Kleckner et al., 2015).
While RHI experiments often include a control condition of
asynchronous stroking as a baseline condition, we opted not
to add this additional manipulation in our experiment. Given
our two-by-two experimental design, additional baseline
conditions would have doubled the number of conditions, to
eight conditions in total, and made the analysis more difficult to interpret because it would have required to evaluate a
three-way interaction. Furthermore, our experimental question concerned whether attentional factors can influence the
illusion at its peak (i.e., during synchronous stroking), not
in a weakened form (i.e., during asynchronous stroking),
which would have therefore contributed information of limited utility.
The accuracy of character string reporting was not formally
recorded. However, according to the experimenter, most if
not all participants recalled the character string correctly,
suggesting high accuracy and engagement with the task.
Here, we note that an oblique rotation should be used
instead given the expected inter-factor correlations (Field
et al., 2012).
We also refer the reader to discussions of demand characteristics, phenomenological control, and imaginative suggestion in the RHI (Dienes et al., 2020; Lush, 2020; Lush et al.,
2020; Roseboom & Lush, 2020).
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